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Lee: Federalism and Water

FEDERALISM AND WATER: THE
CALIFORNIA EXPERIENCE
CLIFFORD T. LEE 1

I. INTRODUCTION
The struggle between California’s water plentiful north and the
water deficient south has marked water conflict in the state for the last
century.2 This struggle has played out in repeated disputes over the operation of the federal Central Valley Project (“CVP”) and the California
State Water Project (“SWP”), the two inter-basin water conveyance facilities that deliver water through-out the state. Commencing in the 1920’s
and 30’s with the enactment of California’s area of origin statutes and
extending in more recent times to federal and state environmental laws, a
complex set of legal requirements constrain the CVP and the SWP’s ability to deliver water to the projects’ agricultural and municipal users.
Doubts about the efficacy of these requirements to achieve their
goals have been long-standing. Former California state senator Peter
Behr’s remark that “[y]ou can’t contain a thirsty beast in a paper cage”
reflects the skepticism held by many that the rule of law cannot effectively constrain project operations in a water-short state such as
California.3
1
Clifford T. Lee was a deputy attorney general from 1979 to 2019 with the California
Department of Justice. As a deputy attorney general, the author represented the California State
Water Resources Control Board, the California Department of Water Resources, the California
Department of Fish and Wildlife, and other state agencies in natural resource litigation, including
litigation involving federalism issues. The views expressed in this article are his own and do not
necessarily reflect the views of the California Department of Justice or other agencies of the State of
California. The author would like to acknowledge the research assistance of Jessica B. Jandura,
Doctor of Jurisprudence candidate, May 2020, Golden Gate University Law School.
2
Seventy-five percent of California’s available water is in the northern third of the state
(north of Sacramento), while eighty percent of the urban and agricultural water demands are in the
southern two-thirds of the state. https://www.watereducation.org/photo-gallery/california-water-101
(last visited Apr. 24, 2020).
3
Norris Hundley, Jr., The Great Thirst 326 (1st ed. 1992).
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This article will address one sub-set of these legal requirements: the
historic requirement that federal reclamation projects such as the CVP
defer to state law relating to the control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water as set forth in section 8 of the federal Reclamation Act of
1902.4 This article will discuss: (1) the origin of the federal reclamation
law principle of deference to state water law and its inclusion in the Reclamation Act of 1902, (2) the application of the deference principle in
California to the CVP, (3) the rise of federal and state endangered species laws as constraints on the CVP and SWP’s use of water, and (4) the
implications of the deference principle as to the question of whether California’s endangered species law applies to the CVP.
II. THE ORIGINS

OF

FEDERAL DEFERENCE

TO

STATE WATER LAW

A. THE EQUAL FOOTING DOCTRINE
As improbable as it may seem, the story behind the principle that
modern federal reclamation projects must defer to state water law begins
with ancient English common law. In a dispute over ownership of the
oyster beds of New Jersey’s Raritan Bay, the U.S. Supreme Court observed in Martin v. Lessee of Waddell that the English monarchy’s sovereign powers under English common law included “[t]he dominion and
property in navigable waters, and in the lands under them, being held by
the King as a public trust.”5 The Martin court begins its story by explaining that King Charles II granted the Duke of York royal charters for
lands that encompassed Raritan Bay, which the duke then conveyed to
twenty-four proprietors. The proprietors subsequently reconveyed certain powers back to the king, but retained title to the land for themselves.6 According to the Court, the royal charters originally conveying
this land conveyed the king’s sovereign powers to the colonial proprietors, and the proprietors’ subsequent reconveyance of the powers back to
the king did not diminish those powers.7 At the conclusion of the American Revolution, the thirteen colonies, freed from English rule, “took into
their own hands the powers of sovereignty” and “the prerogatives and
regalities which before belonged either to the Crown or the Parliament
became immediately and rightfully vested in the state[s].”8 Due to this
transfer of sovereignty, the original states “hold the absolute right to all
4

43 U.S.C. § 383.
Martin v. Lessee of Waddell, 41 U.S. 367, 411 (1842).
6
Id. at 407.
7
Id. at 413-416.
8
Id. at 416.
5
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their navigable waters and the soils under them for their own common
use, subject only to the rights since surrendered by the Constitution to the
general government,” up to the ordinary high water mark.9 Thus at the
nation’s birth, the individual states were “vested” with the general powers of sovereignty, including the power over navigable waters, limited
only by the those powers delegated to the federal government under the
constitution.
As the nation grew beyond the original thirteen states, Congress
passed the Northwest Territories legislation and other enactments declaring that the new states were to be admitted into the Union “on an equal
footing with the original States in all respects whatever.”10 In addressing
a dispute over formerly submerged lands under Mobile Bay in Alabama,
the U.S. Supreme Court in Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan held that “Alabama was admitted into the Union, on an equal footing with the original
States” and “succeeded to all the rights of sovereignty, jurisdiction and
eminent domain” of the original thirteen states.11 Those rights are “absolute” and include “the navigable water[s], and soils under them, in controversy in this case, subject to the rights surrendered by the Constitution
to the United States.”12
This “equal footing” doctrine therefore granted the new states the
broad sovereign powers heretofore held by the English monarchy and
Parliament. In Shively v. Bowlby, the U.S. Supreme Court explained the
state’s sovereign interests in navigable waters in terms of their unsuitability for private possession and the public’s shared interest in their use.
Lands under tidewaters are incapable of cultivation or improvement in
the manner of lands above high-water mark. They are of great value to
the public for the purposes of commerce, navigation, and fishery.
Their improvement by individuals, when permitted, is incidental or
subordinate to the public use and right. Therefore, the title and the
control of them are vested in the sovereign for the benefit of the whole
people.13

The U.S. Supreme Court’s reference to fishery purposes as a “public use
and right” echoes the Court’s earlier recognition in Martin of the English
common law “principle” that “ ‘the public common of piscary’ belong[s]
to the common people of England.”14
9

Id. at 410; Borax Consolidated, Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10, 22-23 (1935).
Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 222 (1845).
11
Id. at 223.
12
Id. at 229.
13
Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 57 (1894).
14
Martin, 41 U.S. at 412.
10
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In Kansas v. Colorado, a case involving the Arkansas river, the U.S.
Supreme Court extended and explained the equal footing doctrine.15
First, the Court expanded the sovereign powers held by the states under
the doctrine beyond questions of state ownership of land underlying navigable waters to include questions relating to the allocation of water
within the states’ respective boundaries. The United States had argued
that it held the power to reclaim arid lands in the western states and that
this power authorized the United States to impose an appropriative water
rights system in the allocation of water from the Arkansas river.16 Relying upon Martin and other equal footing cases, the Court rejected this
argument and held that each state “may determine for itself whether the
common law rule in respect to riparian rights or that doctrine which obtains in the arid regions of the West of the appropriation of waters for the
purposes of irrigation shall control. Congress cannot enforce either rule
upon any state.”17
Second, the Kansas court fleshed out the language in the Court’s
earlier equal footing decisions that the states’ sovereign powers were
“subject to the rights surrendered by the Constitution to the United
States.”18 Citing to its 1899 decision in United States v. Rio Grande
Dam and Irrigation Co., the Kansas court explained that:
Although this power of changing the common law rule as to streams
within its dominion undoubtedly belongs to each state, yet two limitations must be recognized: first, that, in the absence of specific authority from Congress, a state cannot, by its legislation, destroy the right
of the United States, as the owner of lands bordering on a stream, to
the continued flow of its waters — so far at least, as may be necessary
for the beneficial uses of the government property. Second, that it is
limited by the superior power of the general government to secure the
uninterrupted navigability of all navigable streams within the limits of
the United States.19
15

Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907).

16

Id. at 86-87.
Id. at 94. The riparian and appropriative water rights are the two generally recognized
types of water rights under state law. The riparian doctrine confers upon the owner of land the right
to divert the water flowing by his land for use upon his land, without regard to the extent of such use
or priority in time. In times of shortage, the right is reduced proportionally to other land owners.
United States v. State Water Resources Control Board, 182 Cal.App.3d 82, 101 (1986). The appropriation doctrine confers a right upon one who actually diverts and uses water for reasonable and
beneficial use. The right is not linked to land ownership and in times of shortage the right is reduced
on a first in time, first in right priority system. Id. at 101-102.
18
Shively, 152 U.S. at 58; Pollard’s Lessee, 44 U.S. at 229; Martin, 41 U.S at 410.
19
Kansas, 206 U.S. at 86 citing United States v. Rio Grande Dam and Irrigation Co., 174
U.S. 690, 703 (1899).
17
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Seventy-nine years after the Rio Grande decision, the U.S. Supreme
Court would affirm these federalism principles in California v. United
States by declaring “that, except where the reserved rights or navigation
servitude of the United States are invoked, the State has total authority
over its internal waters.”20 But we are getting ahead of our story.
B. THE SEVERANCE DOCTRINE
During the 19th century, the courts were not the only instruments of
the federal government to recognize the principle of deference to state
water law. In the Mining Act of 1866, Congress expressly acknowledged the western mining custom of prior appropriation as the method
for allocating water. Section 9 of that act provided that “[w]henever, by
priority of possession, rights to the use of water for mining, agricultural,
manufacturing, or other purposes, have vested and accrued, and the same
are recognized and acknowledged by the local customs, laws, and the
decisions of courts, the possessors and owners of such vested rights shall
be maintained and protected in the same.”21
In 1870, Congress amended the Mining Act to ensure that federal
land grantees took their lands subject to appropriative water rights by
providing that “. . .all patents granted, or preemption or homesteads allowed, shall be subject to any vested and accrued water rights, or rights
to ditches and reservoirs used in connection with such water rights, as
may have been acquired under or recognized by the ninth section of the
act of which this act is amendatory.“22 In Rio Grande, the U.S. Supreme
Court affirmed the deference to state law principle by declining to read
the Mining Act as creating independent federal water rights, but, instead,
constituting “a voluntary recognition of a preexisting right of possession,
constituting a valid claim to its continued use, [rather] than the establishment of a new one.“23
Passage of the Desert Land Act of 1877 completed Congress’19th
century embrace of the principle of deference to state water law. The act
allowed for the entry and settlement of desert lands in the western states
and, importantly, provided that “. . . all surplus water over and above
such actual appropriation and use, together with the water of all lakes,
rivers, and other sources of water supply upon the public lands and not
navigable, shall remain and be held free for the appropriation and use of
20

California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 662 (1978).
Act of July 26, 1866, § 9, 14 Stat. 253.
22
Act of July 9, 1870, § 17, 16 Stat. 217, 218.
23
Rio Grande, 174 U.S. at 705, citing Broder v. Water Co., 101 U.S. 274, 276 (1879), emphasis added.
21
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the public for irrigation, mining and manufacturing purposes subject to
existing rights.”24
In California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co.,
the U.S. Supreme Court addressed this section of the Desert Land Act in
a dispute over the Rogue river between a riparian claimant holding a
Homestead Act land patent and a cement company holding adjudicated
state water rights.25 The Court defined the issue before it as whether the
“homestead patent in question carried with it as part of the granted estate
the common law rights which attach to riparian proprietorship.”26 The
Court then rejected the landholder’s riparian claim by reading the Desert
Land Act as effectuating a “severance” of all water from public domain
land:
If this language is to be given its natural meaning, and we see no
reason why it should not, it effected a severance of all waters upon the
public domain, not theretofore appropriated, from the land itself.
From that premise, it follows that a patent issued thereafter for lands
in a desert land state or territory, under any of the land laws of the
United States, carried with it, of its own force, no common law right to
the water flowing through or bordering upon the lands conveyed.27

The Court expressly declined to limit its “severance” holding to land
patents issued for desert lands. Recognizing that lands would be held
within watersheds under multiple types of land patents, the Court broadly
applied its “severance” holding and concluded that “it is inconceivable
that Congress intended to abrogate the common law right of the riparian
patentee for the benefit of the desert landowner and keep it alive against
the homestead or preemption claimant.”28
As the nation entered the 20th century, the question raised in Kansas of whether the states controlled the river flow within their boundaries
or whether such “flow is subject to the superior authority and supervisory
control of the United States” appeared settled in favor of deference to
state water law, a deference limited only by the property clause and navigational servitude powers surrendered to the national government under
the constitution.29 However, Congress’ authorization of federally-funded

24

Desert Land Act of 1877, Act of March 3, 1877, § 1, 19 Stat. 377.
California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 151 (1935).
26
Id. at 154.
27
Id. at 158.
28
Id. at 162.
29
Kansas, 206 U.S. at 85-86.
25
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water projects under the Reclamation Act of 1902 would soon re-open
the question of “national control” of the nation’s waterways.30
C. SECTION 8

OF THE

RECLAMATION ACT

OF

1902

By the turn of the century, a bi-partisan movement was growing for
direct federal involvement in constructing water storage projects to reclaim the arid lands of the western states and territories. This self-proclaimed “National Irrigation Movement” obtained favorable language in
the 1900 national platforms of both the Republican and Democratic parties.31 President Theodore Roosevelt’s December 1902 message to Congress supported this movement, arguing that it is “as right for the
National Government to make the streams and rivers of the arid region
useful by engineering works for water storage as to make useful the rivers and harbors of the humid region by engineering works of another
kind.”32 Importantly, Roosevelt’s message embraced the deference to
state water law principle by declaring that “[t]he distribution of the
water, the division of the streams among irrigators, should be left to the
settlers in conformity with State laws and without interference with those
laws or with vested rights.”33
On January 21, 1902, bills were introduced in both the House and
Senate to implement President Roosevelt’s reclamation vision.34 On
June 17, 1902, Congress responded by approving the Reclamation Act of
1902.35 The act (1) created a reclamation fund from the receipts of public land sales in the sixteen western states, (2) authorized the Secretary of
the Interior to investigate and construct water storage projects to be financed by the fund, (3) removed from private transfer public lands required for the projects, and (4) limited the right to use project water on
land in private ownership to tracts of 160 acres or less and to landowners
who resided on or within the neighborhood of the land.36 Under the act’s
30

Id. at 85.
35 Cong. Rec. 6773 (1902). The Republican platform stated, “In further pursuance of the
constant policy of the Republican party to provide free homes on the public domain, we recommend
adequate national legislation to reclaim the arid lands of the United States, reserving the control of
the distribution of water for irrigation to the respective States and Territories.” Id. The Democratic
platform read, “We favor an intelligent system of improving the arid lands of the West, storing the
waters for purposes of irrigation, and holding of such land for actual settlers.” Id.
32
35 Cong. Rec. 6775 (1902).
33
Id.
34
H.R. 9676, 57th Cong., 1st Sess. (1902); S. 3057, 57th Cong., 1st Sess. (1902); Donald J.
Pisani, To Reclaim a Divided West 313 (1st ed. 1992).
35
Act of June 17, 1902, Pub. L. No. 161, 32 Stat. 388-390.
36
Id. Congress removed the residency requirement, enlarged the acreage limitation, and
made other changes to the Reclamation Act of 1902 in the Reclamation Reform Act of 1982. 43
U.S.C., §§ 373(a); 390aa-390zz-1; 422e; 425b; 485h; 502. See generally Peterson v. United States,
31
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authority, the Secretary of the Interior created the Reclamation Service
within the United States Geological Survey to administer the act. In
1907, the Reclamation Service was re-organized as a separate Bureau of
Reclamation (“Bureau”).37
In section 8 of the act, Congress expressly codified the deference to
state water law principle by providing that:
Nothing in this act shall be construed as affecting or intended to affect
or to in any way interfere with the laws of any State or Territory relating to the control, appropriation, use, or distribution of waters used in
irrigation, or any vested right acquired thereunder, and the Secretary
of the Interior, in carrying out the provisions of this act, shall proceed
in conformity with such laws.38

The legislative history of the act discloses two critical points regarding
this section. First, the section was intended to impose state law not only
as to the “appropriation” of water required for the projects, but also as to
the water’s “distribution” and “use.”39 Second, the section was deliberatively drafted to further the deference to state water law principle set
forth in earlier laws such as the Mining Act of 1866 and the Desert Land
Act of 1877.40
Thus, with the passage of the Reclamation Act of 1902, federal
water policy moved forward fully aligned with the principle that federal
reclamation efforts must defer to state water law. However, the 20th
century implementation of the act in California would tell a different
story.

899 F.2d 799 (9th Cir. 1990). Reflecting the anti-Chinese xenophobia of the times, section 4 of the
act also included a provision mandating that in the construction of reclamation projects “no
Mongolian labor shall be employed thereon.” § 4, 32 Stat. at 389. Congress did not remove this
provision until 1956. Act of May 10, 1956, Pub. L. No. 517, 70 Stat. 151.
37
https://www.usbr.gov/history/borhist.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2020). In 1926, Congress
created the position of Commissioner of Reclamation to be appointed by the President and subject to
Senate confirmation. 43 U.S.C. § 373a.
38
43 U.S.C., § 383.
39
35 Cong. Rec. 6678, 6679 (1902) (Mondell); Id. at 6770 (Sutherland); Id. at 6728
(Burkett).
40
Id. at 6679 (Mondell) (”We began to legislate in regard to the use of water in irrigation in
1866. We have legislated continuously along one line [in support of state control].”).
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III. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RECLAMATION ACT OF 1902
CALIFORNIA AND THE RISE AND FALL OF FEDERAL
DOMINION
A. IVANHOE, CITY
SECTION 8

OF

FRESNO,

AND

31
IN

ARIZONA - THE DISMANTLING

OF

During the decades following passage of the Reclamation Act of
1902, the State of California would decline to aggressively defend the
water rights authority granted to it by section 8 of the Reclamation Act of
1902. Furthermore, in a trio of mid-20th century cases, the U.S. Supreme Court would effectively dismantle the section. In Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, the Court reversed the California Supreme
Court’s ruling that section 8 of the act prevented the United States from
enforcing the acreage limitations contained in section 5 of the act against
California landowners receiving reclamation water.41 The California Supreme Court had concluded that state law imposed a fiduciary trust on
water rights holders, including the United States, for the benefit of all
Californians, including all landowners, and that the section 5 limit on the
delivery of reclamation water to landowners holding 160 acres of land or
less violated that fiduciary trust.42 The State of California, through the
California Attorney General, contested the California Supreme Court decision and fully supported the United States’ reading of reclamation
law.43 The Ivanhoe court sided with the United States and concluded
that “[w]e read nothing in [section] 8 that compels the United States to
deliver water on conditions imposed by the State.”44
In City of Fresno v. California, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the
city’s argument that section 8 limited “the United States from exercising
the power of eminent domain to acquire the water rights of others” due to
California’s area of origin law and statutory preference for municipal
use, holding that state authority in such a case is limited “to defining the
41

Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 289-290 (1958).
Id. On remand, the California Supreme Court reversed and repudiated its earlier ruling that
state water rights were subject to a state law fiduciary trust for the benefit of all landowners within
the irrigation district. Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. All Parties, 53 Cal.2d 692, 716 (1960) (“The trust
theory was so interrelated to the erroneous interpretation of section 8 of the Reclamation Act, and so
interwoven with that erroneous interpretation, that it must be held that it fell with that erroneous
interpretation. . .Thus the trust theory is not the law of this case, is dicta, and for that reason should
not be construed as a statement of the law of California.”).
43
Id. at 279 (“This litigation involves a dispute between landowners, on the one hand, and the
combined State and Federal Governments, on the other. As the Attorney General of California
points out, there is no clash here between the United States and the State of California.”).
44
Id. at 292.
42
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property interest, if any, for which compensation must be made.”45 Finally, in Arizona v. California, the U.S. Supreme Court, relying upon
Ivanhoe, held that “[s]ince [section] 8 of the Reclamation Act did not
subject the Secretary [of the Interior] to state law in disposing of water in
that case, we cannot, consistently with Ivanhoe, hold that the Secretary
must be bound by state law in disposing of water under the [Boulder
Canyon] Project Act.”46 When asked a question during the floor debates
over the Reclamation Act of 1902 on “the subject of national or State
control,” Congressman Mondell, the bill’s lead House proponent, responded, “as to State control over appropriation and distribution, I will
say to the gentleman that there is no reasonable ground for disagreement
on that point.”47 Sixty-one years later, the U.S. Supreme Court limited
state “control” under section 8 “to defining the property interest, if any,
for which compensation must be made” when the United States condemns property for reclamation purposes.48 Federal dominion in the
field of water was on the rise.
B. THE CONSEQUENCES OF FEDERAL DOMINION
MANAGEMENT OF ITS NATURAL RESOURCES

TO

CALIFORNIA’S

The most striking consequence of California’s acquiescence to federal dominion and the U.S. Supreme Court’s diminution of section 8 was
the fishery effects of the state’s issuance of water right permits for Friant
dam, a federal reclamation facility located on the San Joaquin river.
Through passage of the Act of August 26, 193749, Congress authorized
the construction and operation of the CVP as reclamation facilities.
These facilities included Friant dam and the Madera and Friant-Kern distribution canals located in the southern Central Valley of California.50
The Bureau commenced construction of Friant dam in 1939, the Madera
Canal in 1940, and the Friant-Kern Canal in 1945. Water deliveries
commenced in 1944.51 However, the State Water Rights Board, now the
State Water Resources Control Board (“State Water Board”), did not issue water right permits for the Friant project until June 2, 1959 in Decision 935.52
45

City of Fresno v. California, 372 U.S. 627, 630 (1963).
Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 587 (1963).
47
35 Cong. Rec. 6679 (1902).
48
City of Fresno, 372 U.S. at 630.
49
Act of August 26, 1937, Pub. L. No. 392, 50 Stat. 844.
50
Id. at § 2, 50 Stat. at 850.
51
Decision 935, Cal. State Water Rights Board 14-15 (1959).
52
Id. at 109.
46
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The effect of allowing the construction and operation of Friant dam
to precede the issuance of the project’s state water rights coupled with
the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Ivanhoe limited the state law terms
and conditions that California could impose on the project. During the
State Water Rights Board hearings leading up to Decision 935, the California Department of Fish and Game, now the Department of Fish and
Wildlife (“DFW”), argued that the operation of Friant dam had eliminated the San Joaquin River spring-run salmon fishery and that the dam’s
operations violated the state law requirement that water rights may only
be issued in the public interest.53 The State Water Rights Board rejected
the Department of Fish and Game’s arguments by noting that “the evidence is overwhelming that the salmon fishery on the San Joaquin River
upstream from the junction with the Merced River is now virtually extinct.”54 The State Water Rights Board then concluded that “to require
the United States to by-pass water down the channel of the San Joaquin
River for the re-establishment and maintenance of the salmon fishery at
this time is not in the public interest and accordingly, the protests of the
Department of Fish and Game to the subject applications are
dismissed.”55
Prior to the construction of Friant dam, the San Joaquin river springrun chinook salmon “was one of the largest Chinook runs anywhere on
the Pacific Coast and has been estimated at several hundred thousand
fish.”56 Construction and operation of Friant dam extinguished this
salmon species and imperiled the separate San Joaquin river fall-run
salmon species.57 The adverse consequences of federal dominion in
water to California’s natural resources had become indisputably clear.
C. CALIFORNIA V. UNITED STATES
SECTION 8

AND THE

RESURRECTION

OF

1. CALIFORNIA V. UNITED STATES
In 1978, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed field in California v.
United States and for the first time gave effect to section 8 of the Reclamation Act of 1902 in accord with the intent of the act’s authors.58 At
issue in California was whether section 8 required the Bureau, as the
53

Id. at 33-34; Cal. Water Code, §§ 1253, 1255, and 1257.
Decision 935, supra note 51 at 40.
55
Id. at 41.
56
Natural Resources Defense Council v. Patterson, 333 F.Supp. 2d 906, 909 (E.D. Cal.
54

2004).
57
58

Id. at 910.
California, 438 U.S. at 674.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2020

11

Golden Gate University Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 3

34

GOLDEN GATE UNIV. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW J. [Vol. 12

operator of the New Melones Project on the Stanislaus River, to comply
with state law terms and conditions imposed by the State Water Board on
the water right permits issued for the project.59 The State Water Board
considered the Bureau’s water right applications for the project in Decision 1422. Testimony before the State Water Board disclosed that the
completed project would inundate nine miles of the upstream portion of
the river that were heavily used for whitewater rafting and other recreational purposes.60 The testimony did not disclose that the Bureau had
any “specific plan for applying project water to beneficial use for consumptive purposes at any particular location.”61 According to Decision
1422, “[b]y failing to present evidence of a specific plan to use the water
conserved by the New Melones Project for consumptive purposes, the
Bureau failed in spirit if not in substance to meet the statutory requirements for approval of a permit to appropriate water for such purposes.”62
Nonetheless, the State Water Board issued water right permits to the Bureau for the project, but limited the Bureau’s ability to store water until
such time as the Bureau could show that it had “firm commitments to
deliver water” for consumptive purposes.63
The United States predictably brought an action challenging Decision 1422, relying upon Ivanhoe and its successors. However, this time,
the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the United States’ claims. Characterizing the preemptive language in Ivanhoe as “dictum,” the California court
rejected the United States’ preemption claim, stating “we disavow the
dictum to the extent that it would prevent petitioners from imposing conditions on the permit granted to the United States which are not inconsistent with congressional provisions authorizing the project in question.”64
Absent an “inconsistent” congressional provision, “[t]he legislative history of the Reclamation Act of 1902 makes it abundantly clear that Congress intended to defer to the substance, as well as the form, of state
water law.”65 According to the Court, the “substance” of state law includes both laws regarding the “appropriation” and the subsequent “distribution” of project water.66 In rejecting the United States’ argument
59

California, 438 U.S. at 647.
Decision 1422, Cal. State Water Resources Control Board 17 (1973). According to the
State Water Board, “streams available for whitewater boating are extremely scarce” and “the Stanislaus may be the second most heavily used river in the nation for that purpose in actual numbers of
visitors per year.” Id. at 23.
61
Id. at 14.
62
Id. at 15.
63
Id. at 30.
64
California, 438 U.S. at 674.
65
Id. at 675.
66
Id. at 674 (“[T]he Act clearly provided that state water law would control in the appropriation and later distribution of the water.”).
60
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that more recent legislative enactments altered the federalism balance regarding reclamation projects, the Court held that “[w]hile later Congresses have indeed issued new directives to the Secretary, they have
consistently reaffirmed that the Secretary should follow state law in all
respects not directly inconsistent with these directives.”67 On remand,
the Ninth Circuit recognized that “an inconsistent congressional directive” referred to a conflicting federal statute and then affirmed all of the
conditions contained in Decision 1422 from federal preemption based
upon the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision.68
2. JUDICIAL DECISIONS PROTECTING CALIFORNIA’S NATURAL
RESOURCES THROUGH APPLICATION OF THE DEFERENCE
PRINCIPLE
At least three appellate decisions decided subsequent to California
have applied the deference to state water law principle to federal reclamation projects in California to protect California’s natural resources.
First, in United States v. State Water Resources Control Board, the California Court of Appeal for the First Appellate District adopted the State
Water Board’s reading of California and rejected the “Bureau’s contention that the Board-imposed conditions for salinity control [in the Sacramento and San Joaquin river delta] are inconsistent with congressional
directives.”69 After reviewing the federal statutes authorizing the CVP,
the Court of Appeal held that “the Board was fully authorized to impose
the challenged water quality standards or conditions, a regulatory exercise which we determine to be consistent with congressional
directives.”70
Second, in Natural Resources Defense Council v. Houston, the
Ninth Circuit, relying upon California, held that the 1992 Central Valley
Project Improvement Act (“CVPIA”) did not facially preempt the appli67
Id. at 678. Outside of the context of federal reclamation projects, the U.S. Supreme
Court’s approach to state water law saving clauses has been mixed. In California v. FERC, 495 U.S.
490, 492-493 (1990), the Court declined to require federally-licensed hydro-electric power facilities
to comply with state law mandated in-stream fishery flows notwithstanding a Federal Power Act
savings clause that was similar, although not identical, to section 8. However, in PUC No. 1 of
Jefferson County v. Washington Department of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 721-722 (1994), the Court
affirmed the imposition of state in-stream flows upon federal power licensees under section 401 of
the Clean Water Act. See also S.D. Warren Co. v. Maine Board of Environmental Protection, 547
U.S. 370, 386 (2006) [same].
68
United States v. State Water Resources Control Board, 694 F.2d 1171, 1176 (9th Cir.
1982) (Section 8 requires “that the United States follow state water law absent a preempting federal
statute,” citing United States v. Tulare Lake Canal Co., 677 F.2d 713, 717 (9th Cir. 1982).)
69
United States, 182 Cal.App.3d at 135.
70
Id. at 136.
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cation of section 5937 of the California Fish and Game Code to the Bureau’s distribution and use of Friant dam waters.71 Section 5937 requires
owners of dams to “allow sufficient water to pass over, around or
through the dam, to keep in good condition any fish that may be planted
or exist below the dam.”72 Section 5937 is a legislative manifestation of
California’s common law public trust doctrine.73 On remand, the district
court affirmed the State Water Board’s view that reclamation law as interpreted in California retained the principle of deference to state water
law and, in applying that principle, required the Bureau to operate Friant
dam consistent with section 5937.74 Notably, neither the Ninth Circuit
nor the district court questioned the inclusion of a provision of the California Fish and Game Code within the scope of section 8, which includes
all “laws of any State or Territory relating to the control, appropriation,
use, or distribution of waters.”75 This suggests that section 8 extends
beyond traditional state water right statutes to include other state natural
resource laws. The litigation resulted in a settlement leading to federal
legislation creating a joint federal-state program to restore the San Joaquin river as habitat for a self-sustaining chinook salmon population.76
Third, in San Luis & Delta Mendota Water Auth. v. Haugrud, the
Ninth Circuit applied the deference principle to support the Bureau’s
2013 decision to release supplemental flows from Lewiston dam on the
Trinity river to protect returning salmon from mortality due to low flow
conditions in the lower Klamath river.77 CVP water contractors had argued that the Bureau’s decision violated California law because the state
water right permits held by the Bureau did not designate the lower Klamath river as an authorized place of use for water stored at the dam, thus
requiring the Bureau to obtain a permit change before using the water for
the supplemental flows.78 The DFW appeared as an amicus and argued
that section 5937 of the Fish and Game Code supported the Bureau’s
decision.79 The Ninth Circuit rejected the contractors’ argument and
held that section 5937 “creates an exception to the permit change re71

Natural Resources Defense Council v. Houston, 146 F.3d 1118, 1132 (9th Cir. 1998).
Cal. Fish & Game Code, § 5937.
73
California Trout, Inc. v. State Water Resources Control Board, 207 Cal.App.3d 585, 626
(1989). See generally National Audubon Society v. Superior Court, 33 Cal.3d 419, 445-448 (1983).
74
Patterson, 333 F.Supp. 2d at 919-921.
75
43 U.S.C. § 383.
76
San Joaquin River Restoration Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 111-11, §§ 10001-10011, 123
Stat. 1349-1364 (2009). The litigation also set in motion steps to reverse the salmon extinction
outcome resulting from the State Water Rights Board’s Decision 935.
77
San Luis & Delta Mendota Water Auth. v. Haugrud, 848 F.3d 1216, 1234-1235 (9th Cir.
2017).
78
Id. at 1234.
79
Id.
72
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quirement” and that the section “requires BOR to allow sufficient water
to pass the Lewiston Dam to maintain the fish below the Dam.”80
Haugrud therefore affirms the Ninth Circuit holding in Houston that the
deference principle under section 8 of the Reclamation Act of 1902 extends beyond traditional water right law and may include provisions of
the California Fish and Game Code intended to protect fishery resources.
3.

RECENT CENTRAL VALLEY PROJECT LEGISLATION AFFIRMING
DEFERENCE PRINCIPLE

THE

Congressional legislation adopted subsequent to California regarding the CVP has included savings clause language that further affirms the
section 8 deference principle. In 1992, Congress adopted the CVPIA.
Section 3406(b) of the CVPIA provides that:
[t]he Secretary, immediately upon the enactment of this title, shall operate the Central Valley Project to meet all obligations under State and
Federal law, including but not limited to the Federal Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. 1531, et seq., and all decisions of the California
State Water Resources Control Board establishing conditions on applicable licenses and permits for the project.81

In 2016, Congress passed the Water Infrastructure Improvements
for the Nation Act (“WIIN Act”), a statute that requires certain operational changes to the CVP.82 Section 4012 of the WIIN Act affirmed the
deference to state law principle by providing that:
This subtitle shall not be interpreted or implemented in a manner
that—preempts or modifies any obligation of the United States to act
in conformance with applicable state law, including applicable State
water law . . .83

The savings clauses in both the CVPIA and the WIIN Act thus uphold
the deference principle. Tellingly, the clauses do not limit the deference
principle to California Water Code provisions related to water rights.
The CVPIA requires Bureau compliance with “state law. . .including but
not limited to” State Water Board water right decisions.84 The WIIN Act
80

Id.
Central Valley Project Improvement Act, Pub. L. 102-575, § 3406(b), 106 Stat. 4706, 4714
(1992), emphasis added.
82
Water Infrastructure Improvements for the Nation Act, Pub. L. 114, §§ 4001-4014, 130
Stat. 1851-1884 (2016).
83
Id. at § 4012(a), 130 Stat. at 1882, emphasis added.
84
§ 3406(b), 106 Stat. at 4714.
81
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speaks of “applicable state law,” including state water law.85 These acts
thus suggest, consistent with the Ninth Circuit decisions in Houston and
Haugrud, that the deference principle extends beyond state statutes directly related to water rights and may include other state natural resources laws.
The resurrection of section 8 of the Reclamation Act of 1902 under
California and its judicial and legislative progeny is an important part of
the deference principle’s historical narrative. However, section 8’s revival does not end our story. As water resource management in California
unfolded in the 21st century, the deference principle faced a new challenge: the management of California’s water projects under federal and
state endangered species laws.
IV. THE RISE OF ENDANGERED SPECIES LAW AS A LIMITATION
THE CENTRAL VALLEY PROJECT AND THE STATE WATER
PROJECT

ON

The rise of federal and state endangered species laws as limitations
on the CVP and the SWP has become the defining characteristic of California water project management in the 21st century. An appreciation of
this development requires a more detailed understanding of these
projects.
A. THE CENTRAL VALLEY PROJECT

AND THE

STATE WATER PROJECT

The CVP and the SWP are two major inter-basin water storage and
delivery systems that divert and re-divert water from the southern portion
of the Sacramento-San Joaquin River Delta (“Delta”). The CVP is operated by the Bureau and consists of twenty dams and reservoirs that together can store nearly twelve million acre-feet of water. The Bureau
holds over 270 contracts and agreements for water supplies that depend
upon CVP operations. Through operation of the CVP, the Bureau delivers water in twenty-nine of California’s fifty-eight counties in the following approximate annual amounts: 5,000,000 acre-feet water for farms,
600,000 acre-feet of water for municipal and industrial uses, and 355,000
acre-feet of water for wildlife refuges.86 The CVP’s major storage facilities are the Shasta, Trinity, Folsom, and New Melones reservoirs up85

§ 4012(a)(1), 130 Stat. at 1882.
U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, Reinitiation of Consultation on the Coordinated Long-Term
Operation of the Central Valley Project and State Water Project Final Environmental Impact Statement at1-1 (2019) (hereinafter “Bureau Reinitiation EIS”).
86
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stream of the Delta.87 These upstream reservoirs release water that
enters the Delta and then can be exported at Jones pumping plant near
Tracy for storage in the joint federal/state San Luis reservoir or delivered
down the Delta Mendota Canal.88
The SWP is operated by the California Department of Water Resources (“DWR”) and includes water, power, and conveyance systems,
conveying an annual average of 2.9 million acre-feet of water. The principal facilities of the SWP are the Oroville reservoir and related facilities,
the San Luis dam and related facilities, facilities in the Delta, the Suisun
Marsh Salinity Control Gates, the California Aqueduct including its terminal reservoirs, and the North Bay Aqueduct and South Bay Aqueduct.
DWR holds contracts with twenty-nine public agencies in Northern, Central, and Southern California for water supplies from the SWP. Water
stored in the Oroville facilities and water available in the Delta are captured in the Delta and conveyed through several facilities to SWP contractors. The SWP is operated to provide flood control and water for
agricultural, municipal, industrial, recreational, and environmental purposes.89 Both the CVP and the SWP operate under a coordinated operations agreement between the United States and California which, as
amended in 2018, coordinates the CVP and SWP’s diversions and storage from common watersheds and apportions regulatory obligations between the two projects.90
CVP and SWP operations adversely affect fish species listed as
threatened or endangered under the federal Endangered Species Act
(“ESA”) and the California Endangered Species Act (“CESA”). These
adverse effects include impediments to fish migration, such as dams or
other barriers, alteration of water temperature, changes in water quality
such as turbidity and salinity conditions, modifications to water flow
conditions, and the redirection or “entrainment” of fish into poor quality
habitat such as the southern Delta or directly into the projects’ pumping
facilities.91 These effects trigger the application of ESA and CESA to
the projects.
87

Id., app. C at C-1 to C-2, fig. C. 1-2, fig. C. 1-3 at C-5 to C-6.

88

Id., fig. C. 1-4 at C-7.

89

California Department of Water Resources, Final Environmental Impact Report for LongTerm Operation of the California State Water Project, app. A at 2-1 (2020).
90

Bureau Reinitiation EIS at 2-1, 3-2.
National Marine Fisheries Service, Biological Opinion on Long-term Operation of the Central Valley Project and the State Water Project 186-200 (2019) (hereinafter “NMFS Opinion”); U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service, Biological Opinion for the Reinitiation of Consultation on the Coordinated Operations of the Central Valley Project and the State Water Project, tbl. 5-8 at 184 (2019)
(hereinafter “USFWS Opinion”).
91
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B. THE FEDERAL ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
The ESA prohibits the “take” of threatened or endangered species
unless the person engaging in the take has obtained incidental take authority through an incidental take permit under section 10 of the ESA or
through a “federal agency action” consultation under section 7 of the
ESA with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (“USFWS”) or the National
Marine Fisheries Service (“NMFS”).92 The ESA defines “take” to include killing, harming and harassing of ESA-listed species.93 ESA regulations define “harm” and “harass” to include habitat modification that
significantly impairs a species’ essential behavior patterns, such as
breeding, feeding, spawning, rearing, migrating and sheltering.94 Violation of the take prohibition may result in civil and criminal prosecution.95
Although infrequently granted, the ESA allows for an exemption to a
federal action agency’s duty to avoid jeopardy to an ESA-listed species
or the destruction or adverse modification of a species’ critical habitat
through an exemption application submitted to an inter-agency federal
committee known as the Endangered Species Committee.96
A section 7 consultation commences with the federal action agency,
in this case the Bureau as operator of the CVP, requesting consultation
with the federal wildlife agencies over the federal action’s potential to
adversely affect the listed species or its designated critical habitat.
Where listed species are present in the area of the federal action, section
7 generally requires the federal action agency to prepare a biological assessment for submittal to the federal wildlife agency.97 The outcome of
92
16 U.S.C. §§ 1538(a)(1)(B), 1536(b), 1539(a). The ESA defines “person” to include individuals and all types of private entities, as well as officers, employees, agents, departments and
instrumentalities of the federal government and local and state governments. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(13).
Under section 10 of the ESA, a federal wildlife agency may issue a permit for the incidental take of
an ESA-listed species where the permit applicant prepares a species conservation plan and the wildlife agency finds that the species take is incidental, that the take will be minimized and mitigated to
the maximum extent feasible, that adequate funding for the plan is available, and that the taking will
not appreciably reduce the likelihood of the survival and recovery of the species in the wild. 16
U.S.C. § 1532(a)(2). Under section 7 of the ESA, a “federal agency action” may receive incidental
take coverage where the federal action agency consults with a federal wildlife agency and obtains a
biological opinion granting incidental take authority. See infra notes 97 to 101 and accompanying
text.
93
16 U.S.C. § 1532(19).
94
50 C.F.R. §§ 17.3, 222.102. The United States Supreme Court has upheld these regulations. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter, Communities for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687, 708 (1995).
95
16 U.S.C. §§ 1540(a)-(b).
96
16 U.S.C. § 1536(g); Eric Yuknis, Would a “God Squad” Exemption under the Endangered Species Act Solve the California Water Crisis?, 38 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 567, 578 (2011).
97
16 U.S.C. § 1536(c)(1).
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the section 7 consultation process is a formal biological opinion prepared
by the relevant federal wildlife agency.98
These opinions can be either a “no-jeopardy” or a “jeopardy” opinion. The wildlife agency will issue a no-jeopardy opinion only if upon
reviewing the description of the federal action the agency finds, based
upon best available science, that the project will not jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered or threated species or result in the
destruction or adverse modification of the species’ designated critical
habitat.99 A jeopardy opinion will be issued if the wildlife agency cannot
make such findings. If the wildlife agency determines that the federal
action will result in species jeopardy or destruction or adverse modification of the species’ critical habitat, then the biological opinion must include additional mitigation measures that are called “reasonable and
prudent alternatives,” which when implemented, prevent species jeopardy or destruction or adverse modification of critical habitat.100
All biological opinions must include an “incidental take statement,”
which may authorize some level of incidental take of the listed species
that does not rise to the level of jeopardy, and that: (1) specifies the
impacts of the incidental take of the species; (2) identifies reasonable and
prudent measures that minimize such impacts; and (3) includes such
terms and conditions as are necessary to ensure compliance with these
measures.101
On October 21, 2019, the NMFS and the USFWS issued biological
opinions addressing the coordinated operations of the CVP and the SWP.
These opinions authorize the incidental take of the following ESA-listed
fish species by the CVP and SWP: the Delta smelt, the Sacramento river
winter-run chinook salmon, the Central Valley spring-run chinook
salmon, the California Central Valley steelhead, the southern distinct
population segment of North American green sturgeon, and the southern
resident distinct population of killer whale.102 The opinions are no-jeopardy opinions.103 They replaced prior jeopardy opinions that NMFS and
USFWS had issued for the CVP and SWP in 2009 and 2008.104

98

16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A).
Id.
100
Id.
101
16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4).
102
USFWS Opinion at 15; NMFS Opinion at 1-2.
103
USFWS Opinion at 393, 398; NMFS Opinion at 797-798, 813.
104
USFWS Opinion at 15; NMFS Opinion at 10.
99
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C. THE CALIFORNIA ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
Like the ESA, CESA also makes it unlawful for any “person” to
“take” an endangered species unless such take is otherwise authorized by
law.105 Section 86 of the California Fish and Game Code defines “take”
to mean to “hunt, pursue, catch, capture, or kill, or to attempt to hunt,
pursue, catch, capture, or kill” a CESA-listed species.106 DWR, as operator of the SWP, is a person within the meaning of CESA.107 Also,
CESA requires DWR, as a state agency, to comply with the statute’s
requirements.108 CESA provides for at least two mechanisms for authorizing the incidental take of CESA-listed species resulting from SWP
operations.109
First, DWR may receive authorization to take CESA-listed species
under CESA’s “consistency determination” process. Under this process,
the DFW may determine that DWR has authorization to take federallylisted species that are also listed under CESA, under either an ESA incidental take permit under section 10 of the ESA or through the biological
opinion consultation process under section 7 of the ESA, provided that
DFW determines that the ESA take authorization is “consistent” with
CESA.110 Second, DWR may receive authorization to take CESA-listed
species by obtaining a separate CESA incidental take permit from
DFW.111 On March 31, 2020, DFW issued a CESA incidental take permit to DWR for the long-term operations of the SWP covering the longfin smelt, the Delta smelt, the winter-run chinook salmon, and the springrun chinook salmon.112

105

Cal. Fish & Game Code, §§ 2080, 2085.
Cal. Fish & Game Code, § 86.
107
Watershed Enforcers v. Department of Water Resources, 185 Cal.App. 4th 969, 988
(2010).
108
Cal. Fish & Game Code, §§ 2052, 2055.
109
CESA provides other means to obtain incidental take authorization. For example, DFW
may authorize take through a safe harbor agreement issued pursuant to Fish & Game Code section
2089.2 et seq. The Natural Community Conservation Planning Act also provides a pathway for
obtaining incidental take authorization for CESA-listed species. Cal. Fish & Game Code, §§ 2830,
2835.
110
Cal. Fish & Game Code, § 2080.1.
111
Cal. Fish & Game Code, § 2081.
112
Incidental Take Permit for Long-Term Operation of the State Water Project in the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta (2081-2019-066-00), Cal. Dep’t. of Fish and Game 43-44 (2020) (hereinafter “DFW Permit”).
106
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V. THE DEFERENCE PRINCIPLE AND THE APPLICATION OF THE
CALIFORNIA ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT TO THE CENTRAL
VALLEY PROJECT
A. THE DIVERGENCE

OF

ESA

AND

CESA FISH PROTECTIONS

Historically, the ESA and CESA fish protections required of the
CVP and SWP have, for the most part, not diverged.113 DWR obtained
CESA take authorization for SWP operations affecting species duallylisted under both ESA and CESA through the consistency determination
process in section 2080.1 of the California Fish and Game Code.114
However, the USFWS’ and the NMFS’ October 21, 2019 issuance of
new ESA biological opinions applicable to the CVP and the SWP, and
DFW’s March 31, 2020 issuance of a new CESA incidental take permit
applicable to the SWP, imposed for the first time new and asymmetric
fish protection requirements on the two projects. The following are
some of the more prominent examples of this divergence:
• Old and Middle Rivers (“OMR”) are tributaries to the Delta. Subject to tidal influences, the flows in these rivers under withoutproject conditions generally move south to north. CVP and SWP
pumping operations in the southern Delta reverse the flow direction of these rivers, increasing the risk of fish entrainment in project pumping facilities and their redirection into poor habitat areas
adjacent to the facilities.115 The DFW Permit generally limits
OMR negative flows to -5,000 cubic feet per second (“cfs”) during
certain periods of the year. However, during the winter and spring,
the DFW Permit grants DFW the authority, based upon real-time
species monitoring, to reduce SWP exports and thus reduce OMR
negative flow to as low as -1,250 cfs to protect the long-fin smelt
and the Delta smelt.116 The USFWS Opinion does not contain any
equivalent OMR limit for the protection of the Delta smelt.117
• Although the measures are not identical, both the DFW Permit and
the NMFS Opinion require the projects to reduce exports so as to
113
An exception to this historical practice has been DFW’s treatment of the long-fin smelt.
The long-fin smelt is a CESA-listed species, but not an ESA-listed species. DWR has historically
obtained CESA take authorization for this species through an incidental take permit from DFW.
Incidental Take Permit for the California State Water Project Delta Facilities and Operations (20812009-001-003), Cal. Dep’t. of Fish and Game (2009).
114
Cal. Fish & Game Code, § 2080.1; Consistency Determination (2080-2009-011-00), Cal.
Dep’t. of Fish and Game (2009); Consistency Determination (2080-2011-022-00), Cal. Dep’t. of
Fish and Game (2011).
115
USFWS Opinion at 135-136, 139-140.
116
DFW Permit at 71, 82, 85-86.
117
USFWS Opinion at 40-48.
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maintain OMR negative flows as low as -2,500 cfs when salvage of
winter-run salmon at project pumping facilities exceeds certain annual thresholds.118 However, the NMFS Opinion allows for the
waiver of this OMR limit if “Reclamation and DWR determine
that further Old and Middle River restrictions are not required
based on risk assessment.”119 The DFW Permit leaves the final
risk assessment decision with DFW where disagreement exists between the projects and DFW.120
• Both the DFW Permit and the NMFS and USFWS Opinions allow
project pumping during storm events to result in negative OMR
flows that exceed -5,000 cfs.121 However, the DFW Permit limits
such exceedance pumping to pumping that does not result in negative OMR flows exceeding -6,250 cfs.122 The NMFS and USFWS
opinions do not impose any numeric OMR limit on exceedance
pumping during storm events.123
• The Low Salinity Zone (“LSZ”) is a variable habitat region in the
Delta where the Delta smelt commonly reside. The LSZ has historically been indexed using a salinity metric known as X2. X2 is
the geographic location of 2 parts per thousand (“ppt”) salinity near
the bottom of the water column measured as a distance from the
Golden Gate Bridge.124 In order to protect the Delta smelt’s
habitat, both the DFW Permit and the USFWS Opinion require the
projects to operate so as to allow sufficient freshwater outflow to
maintain X2 during September and October at 80 kilometers from
the Golden Gate Bridge in above-normal and wet years.125 However, the USFWS Opinion allows the projects to waive the X2 requirement if the Bureau, DWR, and the USFWS determine that
alternative habitat measures provide “similar or better protection.”126 Furthermore, the USFWS opinion appears to exempt the
projects from the X2 requirement “[i]n the event that Reclamation
determines the Delta outflow augmentation necessary to meet 2 ppt
isohaline at 80 km from the Golden Gate . . . cannot be met
through primarily export reductions and is expected to have a high
storage cost.”127 The DFW Permit does not provide the SWP with
any similar waivers or exemptions from its X2 requirement.128
118

DFW Permit at 87-88; NMFS Opinion at 535, 548.
NMFS Opinion at 548.
120
DFW Permit at 71, 88.
121
DFW Permit at 92-94; NMFS Opinion at 479, 530; USFWS Opinion at 47-48.
122
DFW Permit at 93.
123
NMFS Opinion at 479, 530; USFWS Opinion at 47-48.
124
USFWS Opinion at 75.
125
DFW Permit at 114-115; USFWS Opinion at 51.
126
USFWS Opinion at 52.
127
USFWS Opinion at 53.
128
DFW Permit at 114-119.
119
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CESA

The deference to state water law principle outlined above offers a
pathway out of the confusion created by the conflicting fishery requirements imposed by federal and state endangered species laws to the extent
that the principle can be read to require the CVP to comply with CESA
fishery protections.129 During the floor debates over the Reclamation
Act of 1902, Congressman Sutherland presciently observed that reclamation projects had to comply with state law because “if appropriation and
use were not under the provisions of State law the utmost confusion
would prevail.”130 Building on Congressman Sutherland’s remark, the
U.S. Supreme Court in California noted that practical necessity mandates the deference principle because otherwise “[d]ifferent water rights
in the same state would be governed by different laws, and would frequently conflict,” precisely the conundrum California currently faces in
the implementation of ESA and CESA.131 For the following reasons, the
deference principle set forth in section 8 of the Reclamation Act of 1902
should be read to include the application of CESA to the CVP’s “control,
appropriation, use, or distribution” of California waters, thus requiring
the Bureau to obtain incidental take authority for CESA-listed fish species from DFW.
First, inclusion of CESA within the language of section 8 of the
Reclamation Act is consistent with the plain language of the statute.
Section 8’s deference principle applies to the “laws of any State or Territory relating to the control, appropriation, use, or distribution of waters.”132 At least two California appellate decisions confirm that CESA
is a state law that relates to the italicized words in this section. In Department of Fish & Game v. Anderson-Cottonwood Irrigation District,
the irrigation district argued that CESA’s take prohibition was limited to
hunting and fishing activity and did not apply to fish mortality resulting
129
The DFW Permit recognizes that “there may be instances when operational requirements
stated in” the permit “are different from operational requirements of the applicable ESA authorizations, which govern the operations at the CVP as well as the SWP.” Id. at 96. If DWR cannot force
the Bureau to operate the CVP consistent with the DFW Permit requirements by conditioning the
Bureau’s use of SWP facilities on DFW Permit compliance, then the DFW Permit cuts back the
SWP’s obligation to reduce exports to between thirty-five and forty percent of the export reductions
needed to meet the permit’s OMR requirements, percentages agreed upon in the amended Coordinated Operations Agreement between the State of California and the United States. Id. at 96-97.
This permit provision appears to mean that, absent Bureau compliance with the permit’s OMR criteria, full satisfaction of the permit’s OMR criteria may not occur where federal and state OMR fish
protections diverge.
130
35 Cong. Rec. 6770 (1902).
131
California, 438 U.S. at 667-668.
132
43 U.S.C. § 383, emphasis added.
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from irrigation diversions from the Sacramento river.133 The Court of
Appeal for the Third Appellate District rejected the irrigation district’s
argument, noting that CESA’s “intent is to protect fish, not punish fishermen,” and concluded that CESA’s take prohibition “applies to the destruction of fish incidental to lawful irrigation activity.”134
In Watershed Enforcers v. Department of Water Resources, the
Court of Appeal for the First Appellate District held that DWR was a
“person” for purposes of CESA compliance and rejected arguments that
CESA was not intended to apply to the SWP. The Court of Appeal reasoned that it would be “illogical” in the context of
preservation of endangered and threatened species . . . to exempt government agencies from the CESA taking prohibition, when those agencies operate large enterprises (dams, pumping stations, irrigation
systems, etc.) while covering individual hunters and fishermen and
business associations, which would generally take species in fewer
numbers.135

Thus, California courts have recognized that CESA applies to water diversion and storage activities, and thus to the “control, appropriation,
use, or distribution” of water.
Second, DFW’s administrative practice supports the inclusion of
CESA within state laws “relating to the control, appropriation, use, or
distribution” of water. As noted above, DFW has issued to DWR a
CESA incidental take permit under section 2081 of the Fish and Game
Code for the SWP’s take of the long-fin smelt resulting from the SWP’s
diversions.136 Similarly, DFW has granted to DWR consistency determinations under section 2080.1 of the Fish and Game Code to cover the
SWP’s take of CESA-listed species that are also ESA-listed species.137
Finally, on March 31, 2020, DFW issued to DWR a new section 2081
incidental take permit for the long-term operation of the SWP in the
Delta covering all applicable CESA-listed fish species.138 DFW’s longstanding interpretation of CESA as applying to water diversion and storage activities is entitled to “great weight.”139
133
Department of Fish & Game v. Anderson-Cottonwood Irrigation District, 8 Cal.App. 4th
1554, 1562 (1992).
134
Id. at 1563, 1568.
135
Watershed Enforcers, 185 Cal.App. 4th at 982, emphasis added.
136
See supra note 113.
137
See supra note 114.
138
See supra note 112.
139
Yamaha Corp. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 19 Cal.4th 1, 19 (1998).
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Third, an interpretation of section 8 of the Reclamation Act of 1902
that excludes CESA and limits the section to traditional state water right
law renders the words “control,” “use,” and “distribution” in the section
superfluous and denies them separate meaning. This result follows because, at the time of the act’s passage, Congress understood the term
“appropriation” to represent the preferred water right system of the western states.140 As the U.S. Supreme Court observed in California Oregon
Power Co., “[t]he rule generally recognized throughout the states and
territories of the arid region was that the acquisition of water by prior
appropriation for a beneficial use was entitled to protection, and the rule
applied whether the water was diverted for manufacturing, irrigation, or
mining purposes.”141 In most of the west, this rule resulted in “the complete subordination of the common law doctrine of riparian rights to that
of appropriation.”142
Thus, if the drafters of section 8 intended the section’s deference
principle to require federal deference only to traditional state water right
laws, then reference to the word “appropriation” in the section would
have been sufficient and the remaining words would have been superfluous.143 It is a settled rule of statutory construction that “[a] statute
should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no
part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant.”144 A reading of section 8 that limits the deference principle to traditional state
water right laws and excludes CESA would treat the words “control,”
“use,” and “distribution” as superfluous, and therefore contrary to that
rule. Furthermore, section 8 separates the words “control,” “appropria140
During the Congressional debates over the Reclamation Act of 1902, Congressman
Mondell recognized the value of appropriative water rights and spoke disparagingly of the English
common law doctrine of riparian rights. According to Mondell, “[t]he Celt, the Briton, and the
Saxon occupied a territory watered by the rain of heaven, and not only had no practice, but lacked
even legend or tradition of irrigation. On the contrary, they laid down and established a rule of law
relative to rights in water essentially fatal to the development of irrigation.” 35 Cong. Rec. 6675
(1902). In contrast, Mondell observed that “[e]very Act [of Congress] since that of April 26, 1866
has recognized the local laws and customs appertaining to the appropriation and distribution of water
use in irrigation.” Id. at 6679.
141
California Oregon Power Co., 295 U.S. at 154.
142
Id. at 158.
143
California’s recognition of riparian rights along with appropriative rights does not alter
this conclusion. Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255, 338 (1886). California courts have held that the “seasonal storage of water” is not a proper riparian use, but instead may only be secured by way of
appropriation. Colorado Power Co. v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 218 Cal. 559, 564-565 (1933);
Seneca Consolidated Gold Mines Co. v. Great Western Power Co., 209 Cal. 206, 219 (1930). As
water storage projects, California reclamation projects therefore can never invoke or benefit from
riparian rights and can only hold appropriative rights.
144
Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004); Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314
(2009). This rule is a “cardinal principle of statutory construction.” Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S.
167, 174 (2001).
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tion,” “use,” and “distribution” with the word “or.”145 It is also a settled
rule of construction that the use of the word “or” is “almost always disjunctive, that is, the words it connects are to ‘be given separate meanings.’ ”146 This rule further argues that limiting the section 8 deference
principle to traditional state water right laws would deny the words “control,” “use,” and “distribution” their separate meanings.
Fourth, more recent federal statutes relating to the CVP have
adopted a broad reading of the deference principle. Section 3406(b) of
the CVPIA uses open-ended language when it requires the CVP to comply with “State and Federal law, including but not limited to the Federal
Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. 1531, et seq., and all decisions of the
California State Water Resources Control Board establishing conditions
on applicable licenses and permits for the project.”147 After providing
detailed direction to the Secretary of the Interior regarding the operation
of the CVP, the WIIN Act includes a broad state law savings clause that
provides that “[t]his subtitle shall not be interpreted or implemented in a
manner that—-preempts or modifies any obligation of the United States
to act in conformance with applicable state law, including applicable
State water law.”148 Both the CVPIA and the WIIN Act could have been
written to limit the deference principle to traditional state water right law.
Congress, instead, chose to take a broader approach.
Fifth, the Ninth Circuit in Houston and Haugrud expanded the
reach of section 8 outside of traditional state water right laws to include
section 5937 of the California Fish and Game Code.149 In applying the
section 8 deference principle, the Ninth Circuit in Haugrud was asked to
determine whether the Bureau, as an appropriative water right permittee,
must first obtain a change in its water right permit under the California
145

43 U.S.C. § 383.
United States v. Woods, 571 U.S. 31, 43 (2013), citing Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S.
330, 339 (1979).
147
Central Valley Project Improvement Act, Pub. L. 102-575, § 3406(b), 106 Stat. 4706,
4714 (1992), emphasis added.
148
Water Infrastructure Improvements for the Nation Act, Pub. L. 114, §§ 4001-4014, 130
Stat. 1851, 1882 (2016), emphasis added. Section 4005(b)(2) of the WIIN Act does contain a provision that “ma[kes] available” to SWP water contractors any additional CVP “yield” that the CVP
may accrue if WIIN Act implementation “results” in DFW taking CESA actions directed at the
SWP, but not the CVP, that reduce SWP water supplies when compared to the supplies that would
have been available to the SWP under the ESA biological opinions for the CVP and the SWP. Id. at
1859. However, nothing in section 4005 requires DFW to apply CESA to the SWP and the CVP in
an asymmetric fashion or alters the state law deference principle. To the contrary, section
4005(b)(4) states that “[n]othing in the applicable provisions of this subtitle shall have any effect on
the application of the California Endangered Species Act.” Id. at 1860. Section 4005(c)(2)(A) further provides that “[n]othing in the applicable provisions of this subtitle affects or modifies any
obligations of the Secretary of the Interior under section 8 of the Act of June 17, 1902.” Id.
149
Houston, 146 F.3d at 1132; Haugrud, 848 F.3d at 1234-1235.
146
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Water Code before releasing fish flows for the protection of fish in the
lower Klamath river, or whether section 5937 allows the Bureau to make
such releases without first complying with the water right permit change
requirements.150 The Ninth Circuit responded that not only did section
5937 allow the Bureau to release the fish flows, but the section required
the Bureau to release those flows.151 In applying the section 8 deference
principle, the Ninth Circuit in Haugrud thus held that section 8 allowed a
California Fish and Game Code fishery protection provision to displace a
traditional California Water Code water right provision in determining a
reclamation project’s “control, appropriation, use, or distribution” of
water. At least in the Ninth Circuit, the expansion of the section 8 deference principle beyond traditional state water right law appears settled.152
Sixth, a reading of section 8 that excludes CESA from state laws
relating to the “control, appropriation, use, or distribution” of water
would produce anomalous and inconsistent outcomes depending upon
the particular state agency enforcing state law. As noted above, DFW
has already issued a CESA incidental take permit applicable to the longterm operations of the SWP.153 The DFW permit limits SWP exports
from the southern Delta to increase Delta outflow for the protection of
CESA-listed species through OMR, Fall X2, and other flow-related requirements.154 These flow-related requirements are similar in kind to the
flow-related requirements historically imposed upon the CVP under the
State Water Board’s water right decisions to protect fishery resources.155
It would be anomalous and inconsistent for section 8 to be read to include flow-related requirements as conditions contained in a State Water
Board water right permit, but to exclude the very same requirements as
150

Haugrud, 848 F.3d at 1234.
Id. (“This code section not only allows, but requires BOR to allow sufficient water to pass
the Lewiston Dam to maintain the fish below the Dam. . .Therefore, section 5937 permitted BOR to
release water from the Lewiston Dam to ‘keep in good condition’ the fish in the lower Klamath
River without changing its water rights permits.”)
152
That the drafters of the Reclamation Act of 1902 may not have “anticipated” that section 8
would include state fishery protection laws such as CESA or section 5937 of the Fish and Game
Code does not prevent the inclusion of such laws within section 8. Statutory interpretation is driven
by a statute’s “meaning,” not by the statute’s anticipated “result.” As the U.S. Supreme Court has
recently observed in applying the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to workplace discrimination against gays,
lesbians, and transgender people, “[t]hose who adopted the Civil Rights Act might not have anticipated their work would lead to this particular result . . . But the limits of the drafters’ imagination
supply no reason to ignore the law’s demands.” Bostock v. Clayton County, No. 17-1618, slip op. at
2, 24-26 (U.S. June 15, 2020).
153
See supra note 112.
154
DFW Permit at 71, 82, 85-88, 92-94, and 114-115.
155
Revised Water Right Decision 1641, California State Water Resources Control Board
183-187 (2000).
151
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conditions contained in a DFW incidental take permit.156 Section 8 does
not identify which state agencies must implement state laws relating to
the “control, appropriation, use, or distribution” of water. It only requires that the Bureau comply with state laws that relate to the “control,
appropriation, use, or distribution” of water.157
Finally, the requirement in California that state laws apply to reclamation projects unless such laws are “directly inconsistent” with congressional directives regarding the project provides no obstacle to
DFW’s assertion of CESA authority over the CVP.158 The ESA cannot
constitute a conflicting congressional directive because section 6(f) of
the act provides that “[a]ny state law or regulation respecting the endangered or threatened species may be more restrictive than the exemptions
or permits provided for in this chapter or in any regulation which implements this chapter.”159 The biological opinions also cannot constitute
conflicting directives because they are not “a preempting federal
statute.”160
While it is not inconceivable that in implementing CESA, DFW
might issue an incidental take permit or other requirement directed at the
CVP that contained conditions that were “directly inconsistent” with a
congressional directive regarding the CVP, no such preemption claim
would be ripe until after the United States had submitted to DFW jurisdiction under CESA and DFW had taken final action. As the U.S. Supreme Court in California noted, any determination as to whether
“conditions actually imposed are inconsistent with congressional directives” is a determination that “may well require additional factfinding.”161 In the absence of actual DFW conditions, no such a
determination could be made.
156
This reading of section 8 is consistent with the Ninth Circuit decision in Wild Fish Conservancy v. Jewell, 730 F.3d 791 (9th Cir. 2013). In Wild Fish, the Ninth Circuit rejected the
plaintiffs’ claim that a Washington state law mandating the construction of a “durable and efficient
fishway” across a Bureau fish hatchery was a state law concerning “the control, appropriation, use,
or distribution” of water. Id. at 800. However, Wild Fish declined to address the question of
whether a separate state law that required the Bureau to “supply existing fishways with adequate
water” was properly a state law relating to the “control, appropriation, use, or distribution” of water
because that claim was deemed not reviewable under the federal Administrative Procedure Act. Id.
at 800-801. In addition, the Ninth Circuit noted that the State of Washington’s failure to join with
the plaintiffs in their reading of section 8 and state law reduced the “cooperative federalism and
respect for separate sovereignty” concerns raised by the plaintiffs’ section 8 claims. Id. at 798-799.
157

43 U.S.C. § 383.

158

California, 438 U.S. at 678.

159

16 U.S.C. § 1535(f).

160

United States v. State Water Resources Control Board, 694 F.2d at 1176.

161

California, 438 U.S. at 679.

https://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/gguelj/vol12/iss1/3

28

Lee: Federalism and Water

2020]

FEDERALISM AND WATER

51

VI. CONCLUSION
178 years ago, the U.S. Supreme Court in Martin v. Lessee of Waddell held that the thirteen colonies, freed from English rule, “took into
their own hands the powers of sovereignty” and “the prerogatives and
regalities which before belonged either to the Crown or the Parliament
became immediately and rightfully vested in the state[s].”162 In a case
involving the right to shellfish, the Martin court recognized that part of
this sovereign power included the right of the “common people of England” to the “the public common of piscary” and that freedom from
English rule transferred those rights to the states.163 The deference to
state water law principle in section 8 of the Reclamation Act of 1902
formally recognized that transfer of sovereign power to the states as to
reclamation projects. As the above has shown, CESA is a state law relating to the “control, appropriation, use, or distribution” of water under
section 8. The CVP’s submission to DFW’s fishery protection authority
under CESA fully conforms with the deference principle’s historical legacy and should be upheld.

162
163

Martin, 41 U.S. at 416.
Id. at 412.
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